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<title>apt, branch 1.3_exp3</title>
<subtitle>Debians commandline package manager</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=1.3_exp3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=1.3_exp3'/>
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<updated>2016-06-22T12:51:31Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Release 1.3~exp3</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:51:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-22T12:51:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:14e325c7e4b33e8fc6d33b99d1ffd3b934d26ed0</id>
<content type='text'>
Quite a huge churn of new strings.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>add insecure (and weak) allow-options for sources.list</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-20T18:50:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d03b947b0ce4f87d7d5cc48d4d274ab3bd0b289a</id>
<content type='text'>
Weak had no dedicated option before and Insecure and Downgrade were both
global options, which given the effect they all have on security is
rather bad. Setting them for individual repositories only isn't great
but at least slightly better and also more consistent with other
settings for repositories.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ensure filesize of deb is included in the hashes list</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-18T14:27:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5da51e0e2da3f055306562d38103b06a23d81719</id>
<content type='text'>
Filesize is a silly hash all by itself, but in combination with others
it can be a strong opponent, so ensuring that it is in the list of
hashes and hence checked by the normal course of action the acquire
process takes is a good thing.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>add [weak] tag to hash errors to indicate insufficiency</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-18T13:15:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d30036922c6963846db4ab633b13fb87c1b5b462</id>
<content type='text'>
For "Hash Sum mismatch" that info doesn't make a whole lot of
difference, but for the new insufficient info message an indicator that
while this hashes are there and even match, they aren't enough from a
security standpoint.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>better error message for insufficient hashsums</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-18T11:55:39Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:562f0774f8f04d978c7cea69a29c131a0e0ec75f</id>
<content type='text'>
Downloading and saying "Hash Sum mismatch" isn't very friendly from a
user POV, so with this change we try to detect such cases early on and
report it, preferably before download even started.

Closes: 827758
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>source: if download is skipped, don't try to unpack</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-18T07:59:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:60a0cb424e91acebc2bba0f9add220b474e432e6</id>
<content type='text'>
If apt decides it can't download a file it is relatively pointless to
try to tell dpkg-source to unpack it.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>forbid insecure repositories by default expect in apt-get</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-18T13:46:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:952ee63b0af14a534c0aca00c11d1a99be6b22b2</id>
<content type='text'>
With this commit all APT-based clients default to refusing to work with
unsigned or otherwise insufficently secured repositories. In terms of
apt and apt-get this changes nothing, but it effects all tools using
libapt like aptitude, synaptic or packagekit.

The exception remains apt-get for stretch for now as this might break
too many scripts/usecases too quickly.

The documentation is updated and extended to reflect how to opt out or
in on this behaviour change.

Closes: 808367
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>generalize secure-&gt;insecure downgrade protection</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-18T11:50:02Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b1bdfe682054ea6fc202416968c5342d59b403b1</id>
<content type='text'>
Handling the extra check (and force requirement) for downgrades in
security in our AllowInsecureRepositories checker helps in having this
check everywhere instead of just in the most common place and requiring
a little extra force in such cases is always good.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>handle weak-security repositories as unauthenticated</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-17T15:36:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ab94dcece2465f824bea80fc9158bf9a028b2e87</id>
<content type='text'>
APT can be forced to deal with repositories which have no security
features whatsoever, so just giving up on repositories which "just" fail
our current criteria of good security features is the wrong incentive.

Of course, repositories are better of fixing their setup to provide the
minimum of security features, but sometimes this isn't possible:
Historic repositories for example which do not change (anymore).

That also fixes problem with repositories which are marked as trusted,
but are providing only weak security features which would fail the
parsing of the Release file.

Closes: 827364
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>run update post-invokes even on (partial) failures</title>
<updated>2016-06-22T12:05:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-06-16T21:13:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:57f7fb6511fcc7c55ee7a88475d15385093c048e</id>
<content type='text'>
Unsecure repositories result in error messages by default which causes
the acquire run to fail hard, but non-failing repositories are still
updated just like in the slightly less hard-failures which got this
behaviour in 35664152e47a1d4d712fd52e0f0a2dc8ed359d32.
</content>
</entry>
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