apt/apt-pkg/acquire-item.cc, branch 2.1.2 Debians commandline package manager https://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=2.1.2 2020-02-26T13:10:47Z Drop pkgAcquire::Item::ModifyRetries() ABI hack 2020-02-26T13:10:47Z Julian Andres Klode julian.klode@canonical.com 2020-02-26T13:04:51Z urn:sha1:da18eb10188a22fc1698a9b8466272f2826447db Remove pkgAcqFile::Failed overload 2020-02-26T12:55:38Z Julian Andres Klode julian.klode@canonical.com 2020-02-26T12:55:38Z urn:sha1:e4e9af454db78c287ca062ac7d75bdd63bd7f744 Revert "Add a Packages-Require-Authorization Release file field" 2020-02-16T11:46:09Z Julian Andres Klode julian.klode@canonical.com 2020-02-16T10:45:05Z urn:sha1:9cc0e2cab7c83ede99e21c70f248d884b8930983 This experiment did not turn out sensibly, as some servers do not accept credentials when none are expected and fail, so you cannot mirror such a repository. This reverts commit c2b9b0489538fed4770515bd8853a960b13a2618. Remove failed trusted signature instead of index on IMS hit 2019-11-27T21:00:43Z David Kalnischkies david@kalnischkies.de 2019-11-27T11:10:31Z urn:sha1:1690c3f87ae45a41e8d3e09bf0b1021c008460b9 While passing the combi Release and Release.gpg to the gpgv method for verification the filename of Release is placed where usually Release.gpg is assumed in the rest of the code. The "usual" cases like passing verification and failing verification ending in an error are taking care of this, but the code path dealing with a failed verification, but ignoring said failure (e.g. due to trusted=yes) was not which results in the wrong file being removed later on (in case the index happens to be unmodified since the last update call) leading us into the abyss of strange failures (fixed in the previous commit) were nothing should have changed. This is not a security issue in this form as the repository needs to fail verification & the user forcing apt to ignore the failure and carry on anyhow. It does show however how complicated the code and its various interconnected paths can become. Reported-By: Val "pinkieval" Lorentz on IRC Use correct filename on IMS-hit reverify for indices 2019-11-27T20:56:33Z David Kalnischkies david@kalnischkies.de 2019-11-27T18:57:08Z urn:sha1:62bfe5b6ca3ccfba6313d3f9ab4cb75a24a5557a If we have no old Release file, but old indices we can't compare hashsums with the new Release file and hence must request the indices again and have to react to IMS hits if they didn't change. We used to symlink the old index file to the partial directory, but that usually meant that we linked an uncompressed file to a compressed file, which not all uncompressors can deal with transparently resulting in strange failures. We could do without the symlink, but that would require changes in the codepaths dealing with failure as they would rename the file to FAILED. Fix some style warnings from cppcheck 2019-11-26T11:36:46Z David Kalnischkies david@kalnischkies.de 2019-09-13T10:01:47Z urn:sha1:35012abf30ec1cfc9b5ee29647d4b1e25d98e99f Unused variable, std::algorithms instead of raw for-loops. There should be no observeable difference in behaviour. Reported-By: cppcheck Gbp-Dch: Ignore Apply various suggestions by cppcheck 2019-07-08T13:51:17Z David Kalnischkies david@kalnischkies.de 2019-07-08T13:48:59Z urn:sha1:2b734a7ec429825c7007c1093883229e069d36c7 Reported-By: cppcheck acquire-item: Remove deprecated members and functions 2019-02-26T15:31:20Z Julian Andres Klode julian.klode@canonical.com 2019-02-26T12:51:15Z urn:sha1:0dfacb3d014db4c9f337ce2be1a6997dbdc5bde1 Add a Packages-Require-Authorization Release file field 2019-02-01T16:52:03Z Julian Andres Klode julian.klode@canonical.com 2019-02-01T13:43:52Z urn:sha1:c2b9b0489538fed4770515bd8853a960b13a2618 This new field allows a repository to declare that access to packages requires authorization. The current implementation will set the pin to -32768 if no authorization has been provided in the auth.conf(.d) files. This implementation is suboptimal in two aspects: (1) A repository should behave more like NotSource repositories (2) We only have the host name for the repository, we cannot use paths yet. - We can fix those after an ABI break. The code also adds a check to acquire-item.cc to not use the specified repository as a download source, mimicking NotSource. Communicate back which key(s) were used for signing 2019-01-22T11:24:22Z David Kalnischkies david@kalnischkies.de 2018-09-11T23:44:18Z urn:sha1:7bf533967fb385b9625a1ee4dd7c6542a84b489c Telling the acquire system which keys caused the gpgv method to succeed allows us for now just a casual check if the gpgv method really executed catching bugs like CVE-2018-0501, but we will make use of the information for better features in the following commits.