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<title>apt/apt-pkg/contrib/arfile.cc, branch 2.9.0</title>
<subtitle>Debians commandline package manager</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=2.9.0</id>
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<updated>2024-02-20T12:49:04Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Modernize standard library includes</title>
<updated>2024-02-20T12:49:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-20T12:43:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:40a75722c43ae24cb9a99d6730a3b25b65819c49</id>
<content type='text'>
This was automated with sed and git-clang-format, and then I had to
fix up the top of policy.cc by hand as git-clang-format accidentally
indented it by two spaces.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CVE-2020-27350: arfile: Integer overflow in parsing</title>
<updated>2020-12-09T16:30:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-10-19T11:22:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d10c68d628fe5342d400a999a6d10c5c7c0cef41</id>
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GHSL-2020-169: This first hunk adds a check that we have more files
left to read in the file than the size of the member, ensuring that
(a) the number is not negative, which caused the crash here and (b)
ensures that we similarly avoid other issues with trying to read too
much data.

GHSL-2020-168: Long file names are encoded by a special marker in
the filename and then the real filename is part of what is normally
the data. We did not check that the length of the file name is within
the length of the member, which means that we got a overflow later
when subtracting the length from the member size to get the remaining
member size.

The file createdeb-lp1899193.cc was provided by GitHub Security Lab
and reformatted using apt coding style for inclusion in the test
case, both of these issues have an automated test case in
test/integration/test-ubuntu-bug-1899193-security-issues.

LP: #1899193
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SECURITY UPDATE: Fix out of bounds read in .ar and .tar implementation (CVE-2020-3810)</title>
<updated>2020-05-12T16:55:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-12T09:49:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dceb1e49e4b8e4dadaf056be34088b415939cda6</id>
<content type='text'>
When normalizing ar member names by removing trailing whitespace
and slashes, an out-out-bound read can be caused if the ar member
name consists only of such characters, because the code did not
stop at 0, but would wrap around and continue reading from the
stack, without any limit.

Add a check to abort if we reached the first character in the
name, effectively rejecting the use of names consisting just
of slashes and spaces.

Furthermore, certain error cases in arfile.cc and extracttar.cc have
included member names in the output that were not checked at all and
might hence not be nul terminated, leading to further out of bound reads.

Fixes Debian/apt#111
LP: #1878177
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge libapt-inst into libapt-pkg</title>
<updated>2019-05-06T10:14:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-06T09:40:08Z</published>
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