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<title>apt/apt-pkg/contrib, branch 2.9.21</title>
<subtitle>Debians commandline package manager</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=2.9.21</id>
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<updated>2024-12-22T22:51:22Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>methods: Add new sqv method</title>
<updated>2024-12-22T22:51:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-07T15:44:18Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:da9a05e0b0b2150dbb67090e8b0c3922e46bd5cf</id>
<content type='text'>
The new sqv method uses sequoia's sqv tool to verify files. The
tool's interface is quite simple: It returns 0 on success, and
prints one line per good signer with the fingerprint.

sqv has a configurable crypto policy. We have defined apt-specific
override mechanisms for sequoia's standard policy, allowing both
users, distributions, and apt package to provide overrides for
Sequoia's default policy in meaningful ways.

The sqv method will be built and be the standard method for
verifying OpenPGP signatures provided that `sqv` is in the
PATH during building. It is not built if there was no sqv
at build time, so you need a rebuild to enable sqv later
on.

On the flip side, the gpgv method is always built, but it
does need to be always built: If APT::Key::GPGVCommand is
set, we need to fallback to it - this is important to
support existing users of that interface such as
mmdebstrap. Also we want to fall back to it when /usr/bin/sqv
disappears - for example in our CI :D

A couple of concessions have been made for test suite purposes:

- Failure to split a clearsigned file only shows the summary,
  as the gpgv method also only showed it, and no details why
  it failed.
- We write "Got GOODSIG &lt;fingerprint&gt;" in debug mode to mimic
  the gpgv code to keep the test suite happy.

- In various places in the test suite we assert minimal output
  from sqv, but sqv's human output is not intended to be stable.
  This will incur additional work when it breaks. However we do
  not _parse_ the output, so actual operation of apt is unaffected.

A couple of things are suboptimal here:

- We are still doing clearsigned splitting ourselves. sqv only
  has support for detached signatures right now, whereas sqopv
  has support for clearsigned files as well (but sqopv does not
  provide any reasons for why signature verification fails or
  means to set a policy).

- Deprecation of algorithms happens on a timebomb basis in
  sequoia. We have no means to give users warnings ahead of
  time if their configuration is outdated.

We have implemented various bits that probably should be going away:

- Fallback to trusted.gpg
  This is just annoying...
- Support for fingerprints in Signed-By (no subkey matching though)
  The extra work here is arguably less compared to gpgv.
- Check the keyring for correctness.
  With Signed-By everywhere, we should just error out rather than
  skip broken keyrings.

Moo
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove GnuTLS and gcrypt support</title>
<updated>2024-12-22T22:45:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-21T14:26:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7b1fb90b93ced7c0772d726e512da01fad456852</id>
<content type='text'>
OpenSSL is mandatory now, it is no longer possible to build
without https support either.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hashes, methods: Add OpenSSL backends</title>
<updated>2024-12-22T21:55:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-18T18:37:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:90270f0959d490d56db891809d83c91b3d4b9bf0</id>
<content type='text'>
Introduce an OpenSSL::Crypto backend for the hashes library
and an OpenSSL::SSL backend for the TLS support in our https
method.

Many thanks to curl for showing the way with how to handle
a CRL file. There are some memory leaks here with the
TlsFd itself as well as the proxy support; and we should
reorganize the code to generate the ssl object as late
as possible.

A peculiar aspect of OpenSSL is that SSL_has_pending() returns
1 even if SSL_read() will fail to read anything and return the
equivalent of EAGAIN. We work around this here by also peeking
ahead 1 byte. I was running a very high RTT connection from
Germany to Australia for testing, and with the peeking it's
using negligible amounts of CPU; before that, it was busy
looping at 100%. Bad OpenSSL!
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hashes: Add GnuTLS backend, make it default</title>
<updated>2024-12-21T12:31:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-18T18:11:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:470f5cf449ac20c7d7bf50ad805c72a5f52d256f</id>
<content type='text'>
The GnuTLS backend avoids the need to link in libgcrypt, and
gets us another certified library people will be happy with.

This should be an intermediate step on the road to OpenSSL.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>hashes: Refactor backend into PrivateHashes</title>
<updated>2024-12-21T12:31:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-18T17:44:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ef435a3ed9c3e835c799df651f160b658eeee56a</id>
<content type='text'>
Everything is abstracted away now.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Remove gnupg and versioned gpgv test depends</title>
<updated>2024-12-20T07:59:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-20T07:59:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:becf3fed0f5f3da225eb1df2cd306add1fdf5ab8</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gpgv: Extract VerifyDetachedSignatureFile()</title>
<updated>2024-12-17T18:21:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-17T18:20:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f54a561bc81d1bcbce6a107ad535f0c6d6e88d38</id>
<content type='text'>
This is a pretty standalone function, extract it for later
reuse.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gpgv: Drop references to apt-key</title>
<updated>2024-12-07T14:14:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-04T10:12:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2f9775ed580656214e62e7916ee896776fabc9e7</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gpgv: Merge all keyrings into a single one again</title>
<updated>2024-12-04T09:14:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-04T08:56:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:48e5af8b5df391e62657b604b2b54885f7ce1c02</id>
<content type='text'>
gpgv is quite picky, it takes at most 40 keyrings but it also doesn't
even take keyrings with : in the name, generating an ERROR message
instead.

So instead let's always merge the configured keyrings for the source
into a single one.

While we are at it, since we are merging now, let's also add some
rudimentary error checking to what we write into the merged keyring:
If copying into it fails, we should abort.

Reported-by: SuShY on IRC
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Avoid extension check for .gpg</title>
<updated>2024-11-29T08:38:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-29T08:38:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:00b4aa9c1d7f50a6e45c72e7a7c417975932cabb</id>
<content type='text'>
We only ever documented .gpg and .asc and have ensured that
only such files exist in the keyring, but people can set the
Signed-By option to keys with any random extension, as that
was not validated before by apt-key.

This doesn't change the behavior for trusted.gpg.d: We filter
the directory listing and only look at .gpg and .asc files.

Closes: #1088656
</content>
</entry>
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