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<title>apt/test/integration/framework, branch 1.2.8</title>
<subtitle>Debians commandline package manager</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=1.2.8</id>
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<updated>2016-03-21T21:47:17Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>properly check for "all good sigs are weak"</title>
<updated>2016-03-21T21:47:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-21T17:47:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8fa99570816d3a644a9c4386c6a8f2ca21480329</id>
<content type='text'>
Using erase(pos) is invalid in our case here as pos must be a valid and
derefenceable iterator, which isn't the case for an end-iterator (like
if we had no good signature).
The problem runs deeper still through as VALIDSIG is a keyid while
GOODSIG is just a longid so comparing them will always fail.

Closes: 818910
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tests: reenable basic auth test and add @ in username</title>
<updated>2016-03-19T08:48:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-18T10:37:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:28b2efcb190edd97b802ac9055eaf417f141f724</id>
<content type='text'>
On launchpad #1558484 a user reports that @ in the authentication tokens
parsing of sources.list isn't working in an older (precise) version. It
isn't the recommended way of specifying passwords and co (auth.conf is),
but we can at least test for regressions (and in this case test at all…
who was that "clever" boy disabling a test with exit……… oh, nevermind.

Git-Dch: Ignore
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>test framework: Pass -n to lsof to speed up finding the https port</title>
<updated>2016-03-17T11:49:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-17T11:49:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6970f6e6c73116e7c5b488eefe81cd4de98c9170</id>
<content type='text'>
There is no point in resolving all addresses to their names, this
just seriously slows the setup phase down. So just pass -n to not
resolve names anymore.

Gbp-Dch: ignore
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix bug where the problemresolve can put a pkg into a heisenstate</title>
<updated>2016-03-15T17:55:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Vogt</name>
<email>mvo@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-15T12:13:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0390edd5452b081f8efcf412f96d535a1d959457</id>
<content type='text'>
The problemresolver will set the candidate version for pkg P back
to the current version if it encounters an impossible to satisfy
critical dependency on P. However it did not set the State of
the package back as well which lead to a situation where P is
neither in Keep,Install,Upgrade,Delete state.

Note that this can not be tested via the traditional sh based
framework. I added a python-apt based test for this.

LP: #1550741

[jak@debian.org: Make the test not fail if apt_pkg cannot be
 imported]
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>test: Move --weak-digest initialization to the right place</title>
<updated>2016-03-14T12:49:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-14T12:49:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0cbb7e29c5dad2178896d8eaf41ad616bb0111da</id>
<content type='text'>
This was wrong and caused some issues because apt-key invoked
host apt-config with our library.

Gbp-Dch: ignore
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>test: Use SHA512 digests for GPG, reject SHA1-based signatures</title>
<updated>2016-03-14T12:46:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-14T12:24:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:493a813e8a743cfe763bf5eb18073ef9f51dabc2</id>
<content type='text'>
This makes the test suite safe if we ever need to reject SHA1
signatures in an update.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Do not consider SHA1 usable</title>
<updated>2016-03-13T12:01:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-03-13T11:21:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:51c04562559d0924aa52cc8c9b69901bc8a5c945</id>
<content type='text'>
SHA1 is not reasonably secure anymore, so we should not consider it
usable anymore. The test suite is adjusted to account for this.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tests: expect no output while compiling noopchroot</title>
<updated>2016-03-06T08:39:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-16T15:02:46Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a66e1837812cefc1f08788f8696724d4931e8022</id>
<content type='text'>
This way we hopefully notice (new) warnings in this little helper.

Git-Dch: Ignore
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>test: Fix apt-key tests to work with current gpg 2.1</title>
<updated>2016-02-04T17:13:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-04T17:13:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:eb5113c486955d9cd66126aa59d3a27e52c52e58</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>only warn about missing/invalid Date field for now</title>
<updated>2016-01-27T15:39:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-27T14:28:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6fc2e03084c7e027c2b9a63c1fe99ff743aae3b6</id>
<content type='text'>
The Date field in the Release file is useful to avoid allowing an
attacker to 'downgrade' a user to earlier Release files (and hence to
older states of the archieve with open security bugs). It is also needed
to allow a user to define min/max values for the validation of a Release
file (with or without the Release file providing a Valid-Until field).

APT wasn't formally requiring this field before through and (agrueable
not binding and still incomplete) online documentation declares it
optional (until now), so we downgrade the error to a warning for now to
give repository creators a bit more time to adapt – the bigger ones
should have a Date field for years already, so the effected group should
be small in any case.

It should be noted that earlier apt versions had this as an error
already, but only showed it if a Valid-Until field was present (or the
user tried to used the configuration items for min/max valid-until).

Closes: 809329
</content>
</entry>
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