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<title>apt/test/integration/test-method-gpgv-legacy-keyring, branch 2.9.2</title>
<subtitle>Debians commandline package manager</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=2.9.2</id>
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<updated>2024-01-09T16:33:58Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Typos in integration tests</title>
<updated>2024-01-09T16:33:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gábor Németh</name>
<email>homar@riseup.net</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-15T12:12:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:deeda8948be59730659972185e279fbe1b438121</id>
<content type='text'>
Corrected 'und' -&gt; 'and' in the fake package's description.
As a result, the MD5 checksum of this string is changed from
36ef2ec58c83bc4fdbe9fe958dd9c107 to 5022766cbc9bf07d1abea2c41a72646f
which in turn reduced the size of the resulting Packages.gz by one.
Therefore the accepted answer in the test case is updated too.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>gpgv: Fix legacy fallback on unavailable keys</title>
<updated>2022-03-07T10:53:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-07T10:53:27Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ee427f308600a4a3a6f67a4a7835e1172605ba06</id>
<content type='text'>
If a repository is signed with multiple keys, apt 2.4.0 would
ignore the fallback result if some keys were still missing,
causing signature verification to fail.

Rework the logic such that when checking if fallback was "succesful",
missing keys are ignored - it only matters if we managed to verify
one key now, whether good or bad.

Likewise, simplify the logic when to do the fallback:

If there was a bad signature in trusted.gpg.d, do NOT fallback at all
- this is a minor security issue, as a key in trusted.gpg.d could
fail silently with a bad signature, and then a key in trusted.gpg
might allow the signature to succeed (as trusted.gpg.d key is then
missing).

Only fallback if we are missing a good signature, and there are
keys we have not yet checked.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Warn if the legacy trusted.gpg keyring is used for verification</title>
<updated>2022-02-22T17:25:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-07T11:43:32Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:56adf743b02b80a9acc9a2e480bfd15acb94f755</id>
<content type='text'>
With apt-key going away, people need to manage key files, rather
than keys, so they need to know if any keys are in the legacy keyring.
</content>
</entry>
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