apt/test/integration/test-method-gpgv, branch mainDebians commandline package managerhttps://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=main2024-12-19T22:41:01ZUse sq in the test suite, remove apt-key2024-12-19T22:41:01ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2024-12-19T21:11:04Zurn:sha1:a00fbbdb28cc31e78882301c2efe7218583ab4cb
Remove the test case for MD5 and expired signatures, as we can't
create them (can't set signing digest, and can't set signature
expiry).
Tests for them have been added to test-method-gpgv instead.
We override sq in a function with cert-store and key-store
set to none.
This supports both sq 0.40 and sq 1.0.
Directly call gpgv instead of apt-key2024-11-28T18:01:36ZJulian Andres Klodejak@debian.org2024-11-23T18:59:24Zurn:sha1:325b0c89358dae042ebfe0ba6dcbcc43253927a6Only revoke weak RSA keys for now, add 'next' and 'future' levels2024-07-15T17:17:55ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2024-07-15T17:13:58Zurn:sha1:47deb766c0a11c54d122197531279677545459af
Algorithms not in the next level give a warning, algorithms
in not in the future level introduce an audit message for
the --audit flag.
next: >=rsa2048,ed25519,ed448,nistp256,nistp384,nistp512
future: >=rsa3072,ed25519,ed448
LP: #2073126
Revert "Temporarily downgrade key assertions to "soon worthless""2024-04-09T17:59:52ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2024-04-09T17:56:26Zurn:sha1:81c65f7e86b8f16eaaa91d9c205a594b0ebde159
We temporarily downgraded the errors to warnings to give the
launchpad PPAs time to be fixed, but warnings are not safe:
Untrusted keys could be hiding on your system, but just not
used at the moment. Hence revert this so we get the errors we
want.
This reverts commit 66998ed3d299bede651ad40368bdb270f5f5b0f9.
LP: #2060721
Gbp-Dch: full
Temporarily downgrade key assertions to "soon worthless"2024-02-28T17:22:01ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2024-02-28T16:04:05Zurn:sha1:66998ed3d299bede651ad40368bdb270f5f5b0f9
This will only issue warnings instead of errors while we continue
cleaning up our repositories.
Rename 'weak digest algorithm' to 'weak algorithm'2024-02-28T17:22:01ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2024-02-28T15:52:33Zurn:sha1:8a14c18c5b487139948dcb22abd37bffdd9cf5f4
This allows us to render public key algorithms as weak as well.
Implement gpgv --assert-pubkey-algo=>=rsa2048,ed25519,ed4482024-02-28T17:22:01ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2024-02-28T14:14:43Zurn:sha1:50e3fee26ae843a812b1c9ec8531946931773fd3
The assertion can be overriden using apt::key::assert-pubkey-algo,
the default is the most opinionated one.
This will inform the user during apt-cdrom add as we do not
pass --quiet to user, so adjust test case.
Add a simple test case for it to test-method-gpgv.
LP: #2055193
gpgv: Add a reason to worthless signers2024-02-28T17:21:01ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2024-02-28T13:49:48Zurn:sha1:60d653634f889abe09c0f4d88f2559eab9202635Fail on non-signature lines in Release.gpg2019-01-23T21:48:16ZDavid Kalnischkiesdavid@kalnischkies.de2019-01-23T19:50:29Zurn:sha1:e2965b0b6bdd68ffcad0e06d11755412a7e16e50
The exploit for CVE-2019-3462 uses the fact that a Release.gpg file can
contain additional content beside the expected detached signature(s).
We were passing the file unchecked to gpgv which ignores these extras
without complains, so we reuse the same line-reading implementation we
use for InRelease splitting to detect if a Release.gpg file contains
unexpected data and fail in this case given that we in the previous
commit we established that we fail in the similar InRelease case now.
Communicate back which key(s) were used for signing2019-01-22T11:24:22ZDavid Kalnischkiesdavid@kalnischkies.de2018-09-11T23:44:18Zurn:sha1:7bf533967fb385b9625a1ee4dd7c6542a84b489c
Telling the acquire system which keys caused the gpgv method to
succeed allows us for now just a casual check if the gpgv method
really executed catching bugs like CVE-2018-0501, but we will make use
of the information for better features in the following commits.