apt/test/integration/test-releasefile-date-older, branch 2.7.11

Do not store trusted=yes Release file unconditionally

2023-03-04T12:07:00Z

A source marked with trusted=yes can still fail verification of the Release file, mostly for Date related issues, like being too new or too old, which have other options to force them in. The update code was not using the Release file (which was a InRelease file but failed verification – which was overridden by trusted=yes) as intended, but it marked it for storage, so that this "bad" Release file would end up being moved into lists/, which is bad as the indexes it refers to aren't updated while the next update run assumes that the indexes are in the state the Release file claims them to be in. Fixed simply by making the storage conditional on the usage as intended, which also resolves a second issue: The verification can also detect that a Release file we got is older than what we already have to avoid down- grade attacks. The more likely explanation is a slightly outdated mirror in a rotation/CDN through, so this gets the silent treatment to avoid scaring users by handling it as if we had got the same Release file we already have stored locally, removing the freshly received older file in the process alongside setting some variables. Those variables were already modified in the trusted=yes case though resulting in the stored Release file being removed instead. Not modifying the variables too early resolves this problem as well. Both seem to exist since at least 2015 as traces are visible in 448c38bdcd already, which shuffled lots of code around including the bad ones, but as we are in trusted=yes land, security is of no concern here, this "just" leads to failed pinning, hashsum mismatches and other strange problems in follow-up calls depending on how out of sync the Release file (if its still present) is with the rest of the trusted data. Reported-By: Dima Kogan on IRC Tested-By: Dima Kogan

tests: allow to disable generation of InRelease/Release.gpg file

2016-05-04T10:12:27Z

If the test just signs release files to throw away one of them to test the other, we can just as well save the time and not create it. Git-Dch: Ignore

only warn about missing/invalid Date field for now

2016-01-27T15:39:52Z

The Date field in the Release file is useful to avoid allowing an attacker to 'downgrade' a user to earlier Release files (and hence to older states of the archieve with open security bugs). It is also needed to allow a user to define min/max values for the validation of a Release file (with or without the Release file providing a Valid-Until field). APT wasn't formally requiring this field before through and (agrueable not binding and still incomplete) online documentation declares it optional (until now), so we downgrade the error to a warning for now to give repository creators a bit more time to adapt – the bigger ones should have a Date field for years already, so the effected group should be small in any case. It should be noted that earlier apt versions had this as an error already, but only showed it if a Valid-Until field was present (or the user tried to used the configuration items for min/max valid-until). Closes: 809329

tests: support spaces in path and TMPDIR

2015-12-19T22:04:34Z

This doesn't allow all tests to run cleanly, but it at least allows to write tests which could run successfully in such environments. Git-Dch: Ignore

treat older Release files than we already have as an IMSHit

2015-05-18T20:15:06Z

Valid-Until protects us from long-living downgrade attacks, but not all repositories have it and an attacker could still use older but still valid files to downgrade us. While this makes it sounds like a security improvement now, its a bit theoretical at best as an attacker with capabilities to pull this off could just as well always keep us days (but in the valid period) behind and always knows which state we have, as we tell him with the If-Modified-Since header. This is also why this is 'silently' ignored and treated as an IMSHit rather than screamed at the user as this can at best be an annoyance for attackers. An error here would 'regularily' be encountered by users by out-of-sync mirrors serving a single run (e.g. load balancer) or in two consecutive runs on the other hand, so it would just help teaching people ignore it. That said, most of the code churn is caused by enforcing this additional requirement. Crisscross from InRelease to Release.gpg is e.g. very unlikely in practice, but if we would ignore it an attacker could sidestep it this way.