apt/test/libapt, branch 2.3.2Debians commandline package managerhttps://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=2.3.22021-04-23T10:25:40Zjson: Encode NULL strings as null2021-04-23T10:25:40ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2021-04-21T10:21:41Zurn:sha1:b5211b9b213273c642a790ae3c3f3bbe1a4cf51e
This is the only nullable thing we have here.
json: Actually pop states2021-04-23T10:25:40ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2021-04-21T10:17:55Zurn:sha1:09e3c0c855e339216784a1d43715c3ae2d79ec23
The JSON encoder only looked at the top state, but did not
pop it, so if we nested objects, we got stuck in whatever
the last state we pushed aside was, so in our example, we
wrongly get a comma inserted _after_ key "b":
{"a":[{}],
"b":,[{}]
}
json: Escape strings using \u escape sequences, add test2021-04-23T10:25:40ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2021-04-21T09:31:46Zurn:sha1:57b727af4e1eea4ea118ca5e5028fa7ce86fb538
This allows us to correctly encode strings containing quotation
marks, escape characters and control characters.
The test case is a bit nasty because it embeds private-cachefile.cc
for linkage reasons.
Check for and discard expected warning from MaybeAddAuth2021-03-31T13:29:09ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2021-03-31T13:25:18Zurn:sha1:8613225f314e2524d9178e232940059a8687cc69
MaybeAddAuth() here tells us that it refused to use the credentials
for an http source; but that caused the test suite to fail at a later
stage because we checked if there were any errors/warning. Strangely,
this is only triggered with LTO enabled.
Actually check that the warning is being set and then reject it.
Avoid overstepping bounds in config file parsing2021-02-03T16:43:13ZDavid Kalnischkiesdavid@kalnischkies.de2021-02-03T16:40:05Zurn:sha1:c4da2ff42da55ffc38c77a9170dc151216d75962
Our configuration files are not security relevant, but having a parser
which avoids crashing on them even if they are seriously messed up is
not a bad idea anyway. It is also a good opportunity to brush up the
code a bit avoiding a few small string copies with our string_view.
Forbid negative values in unsigned StrToNum explicitly2021-02-03T16:36:46ZDavid Kalnischkiesdavid@kalnischkies.de2020-05-13T07:07:19Zurn:sha1:e0743a85c5f5f2f83d91c305450e8ba192194cd8
strtoul(l) surprises us with parsing negative values which should not
exist in the places we use to parse them, so we can just downright
refuse them rather than trying to work with them by having them promoted
to huge positive values.
Don't parse \x and \0 past the end in DeEscapeString2021-02-03T16:36:45ZDavid Kalnischkiesdavid@kalnischkies.de2020-12-03T09:44:27Zurn:sha1:ed192f410da36aedf5e54bb3f967e6613ab4bb51
This has no attack surface though as the loop is to end very soon anyhow
and the method only used while reading CD-ROM mountpoints which seems
like a very unlikely attack vector…
Fix incorrect base64 encoding due to int promotion2021-02-03T16:36:45ZDavid Kalnischkiesdavid@kalnischkies.de2020-12-03T09:41:43Zurn:sha1:10f13938bbf1474451fadcd62e1c31c4b5f5b3d7
For \xff and friends with the highest bit set and hence being a negative
value on signed char systems the wrong encoding is produced as we run
into undefined behaviour accessing negative array indexes.
We can avoid this problem simply by using an unsigned data type.
Add a simple test for APT::String::DisplayLength2021-02-03T16:36:45ZDavid Kalnischkiesdavid@kalnischkies.de2020-12-03T09:35:29Zurn:sha1:1b3ad3891465f8b72bcedfb4edd513cb74eec7f3
References: 2497198e9599a6a8d4d0ad08627bcfc7ea49c644
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
patterns: Terminate short pattern by ~ and !2020-12-07T14:11:20ZJulian Andres Klodejulian.klode@canonical.com2020-12-07T14:04:30Zurn:sha1:f9a621d335622a8909177f6d347e32e3876fde3f
This allows patterns like ~nalpha~nbeta and ~nalpha!~nbeta to
work like they do in APT.
Also add a comment to remind readers that everything in START
should be in short too.
Cc: stable >= 2.0