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<title>apt/test, branch 1.7.0_rc1</title>
<subtitle>Debians commandline package manager</subtitle>
<id>https://git.kalnischkies.de/apt/atom?h=1.7.0_rc1</id>
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<updated>2018-09-18T12:05:20Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'bugfix/statusfd' into 'master'</title>
<updated>2018-09-18T12:05:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>jak@debian.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-18T12:05:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:252a0a5020726a7b1ee53f2ed5f00e1210f5f4d1</id>
<content type='text'>
Process all of --status-fd and don't expect duplicate status msg

See merge request apt-team/apt!26</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Show all architectures in 'apt list' output</title>
<updated>2018-09-15T15:45:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-15T15:45:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:32e0587d1819ca4b09cd146b0114a1c56ce4a8a9</id>
<content type='text'>
The uniqueness in std::set containers is ensured by the ordering
operator we provide, but it was not considering that different versions
can have the same description like the different architectures for a
version of a package.

Closes: #908218
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Reorder progress report messages</title>
<updated>2018-09-11T11:08:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-10T19:34:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:329c8d5e149465003ea9007661a7af1099c75c43</id>
<content type='text'>
We are seeing 'processing' messages from dpkg first, so it makes sense
to translate them to "Preparing" messages instead of using "Installing"
and co to override these shortly after with the "Preparing" messages.

The difference isn't all to visible as later messages tend to linger far
longer in the display than the ealier ones, but at least in a listing it
seems more logical.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't expect duplicated dpkg status-fd messages</title>
<updated>2018-09-11T11:08:58Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-10T16:43:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f484906eff85c8c9eadc13ce817d8857abdd08e8</id>
<content type='text'>
The progress reporting relies on parsing the status reports of
dpkg which used to repeat being in the same state multiple times
in the same run, but by fixing #365921 it will stop doing so.

The problem is in theory just with 'config-files' in case we do purge as
this (can) do remove + purge in one step, but we remove this also for
the unpack + configure combination althrough we handle these currently
in two independent dpkg calls.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Unset more environment variables in test framework</title>
<updated>2018-09-11T10:59:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-09T22:00:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a5953d914488c80c28fba6b59d2f0be461cd9f03</id>
<content type='text'>
It is an uphill battle to "reset" the environment to a clean state
without making it needlessly hard to use 'good' environment variables,
so we just try a little harder here without really trying for
completeness.

Gbp-Dch: Ignore
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't use gpg directly in apt-key test</title>
<updated>2018-09-10T19:57:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-09T19:36:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8ca3544bcb5506bb5e07e4c750503e64271c1ff1</id>
<content type='text'>
Reported-By: Guillem Jover &lt;guillem@debian.org&gt;
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix typos reported by codespell &amp; spellintian</title>
<updated>2018-08-29T15:51:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-29T15:01:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c4862d49bbc30c37f4fca966ac515692e26d93be</id>
<content type='text'>
No user-visible change as it effects mostly code comments and
not a single error message, manpage or similar.

Reported-By: codespell &amp; spellintian
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't use invalid iterator in Fallback-Of handling</title>
<updated>2018-08-29T15:50:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T07:54:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:55585d0f93de1a0e60858e594b1b3b46f4a0831f</id>
<content type='text'>
cppcheck reports: (error) Iterator 't' used after element has been erased.

The loop is actually fashioned to deal with this (not in the most
efficient way, but in simplest and speed isn't really a concern here)
IF this codepath had a "break" at the end… so I added one.

Note that the tests aren't failing before (and hopefully after) the
change as the undefined behavior we encounter is too stable.

Thanks: David Binderman for reporting
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>clear alternative URIs for mirror:// between steps (CVE-2018-0501)</title>
<updated>2018-08-20T16:29:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-18T15:32:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:29658a3a74af49e2a24e17bdebb20e1612aac3ec</id>
<content type='text'>
APT in 1.6 saw me rewriting the mirror:// transport method, which works
comparable to the decommissioned httpredir.d.o "just" that apt requests
a mirror list and performs all the redirections internally with all the
bells like parallel download and automatic fallback (more details in the
apt-transport-mirror manpage included in the 1.6 release).

The automatic fallback is the problem here: The intend is that if a file
fails to be downloaded (e.g. because the mirror is offline, broken,
out-of-sync, …) instead of erroring out the next mirror in the list is
contacted for a retry of the download.

Internally the acquire process of an InRelease file (works with the
Release/Release.gpg pair, too) happens in steps: 1) download file and 2)
verify file, both handled as URL requests passed around. Due to an
oversight the fallbacks for the first step are still active for the
second step, so that the successful download from another mirror stands
in for the failed verification… *facepalm*

Note that the attacker can not judge by the request arriving for the
InRelease file if the user is using the mirror method or not. If entire
traffic is observed Eve might be able to observe the request for
a mirror list, but that might or might not be telling if following
requests for InRelease files will be based on that list or for another
sources.list entry not using mirror (Users have also the option to have
the mirror list locally (via e.g. mirror+file://) instead of on a remote
host). If the user isn't using mirror:// for this InRelease file apt
will fail very visibly as intended.

(The mirror list needs to include at least two mirrors and to work
reliably the attacker needs to be able to MITM all mirrors in the list.
For remotely accessed mirror lists this is no limitation as the attacker
is in full control of the file in that case)

Fixed by clearing the alternatives after a step completes (and moving a pimpl
class further to the top to make that valid compilable code). mirror://
is at the moment the only method using this code infrastructure (for all
others this set is already empty) and the only method-independent user
so far is the download of deb files, but those are downloaded and
verified in a single step; so there shouldn't be much opportunity for
regression here even through a central code area is changed.

Upgrade instructions: Given all apt-based frontends are affected, even
additional restrictions like signed-by are bypassed and the attack in
progress is hardly visible in the progress reporting of an update
operation (the InRelease file is marked "Ign", but no fallback to
"Release/Release.gpg" is happening) and leaves no trace (expect files
downloaded from the attackers repository of course) the best course of
action might be to change the sources.list to not use the mirror family
of transports ({tor+,…}mirror{,+{http{,s},file,…}}) until a fixed
version of the src:apt packages are installed.

Regression-Of: 355e1aceac1dd05c4c7daf3420b09bd860fd169d,
 57fa854e4cdb060e87ca265abd5a83364f9fa681
LP: #1787752
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Report (soon) worthless keys if gpg uses fpr for GOODSIG</title>
<updated>2018-08-19T15:30:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Kalnischkies</name>
<email>david@kalnischkies.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-16T21:36:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b934870c4f893be28eb1537910c0aadce6dd6e09</id>
<content type='text'>
gpgs DETAILS documentation file declares that GOODSIG could report keyid
or fingerprint since gpg2, but for the time being it is still keyid
only. Who knows if that will ever change as that feels like an interface
break with dangerous security implications, but lets be better safe than
sorry especially as the code dealing with signed-by keyids is prepared
for this already. This code is rewritten still to have them all use the
same code for this type of problem.
</content>
</entry>
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