diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/po/es.po')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/po/es.po | 114 |
1 files changed, 84 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/doc/po/es.po b/doc/po/es.po index 262fd07be..cb4ed2cd8 100644 --- a/doc/po/es.po +++ b/doc/po/es.po @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: apt-doc 1.0.5\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: APT Development Team <deity@lists.debian.org>\n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-06-11 17:24+0200\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-06-22 14:50+0200\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2014-07-04 01:31+0200\n" "Last-Translator: Omar Campagne <ocampagne@gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Debian l10n Spanish <debian-l10n-spanish@lists.debian.org>\n" @@ -2039,8 +2039,9 @@ msgstr "" #: apt-get.8.xml msgid "" "Forbid the update command to acquire unverifiable data from configured " -"sources. Apt will fail at the update command for repositories without valid " -"cryptographically signatures. Configuration Item: <literal>Acquire::" +"sources. APT will fail at the update command for repositories without valid " +"cryptographically signatures. See also &apt-secure; for details on the " +"concept and the implications. Configuration Item: <literal>Acquire::" "AllowInsecureRepositories</literal>." msgstr "" @@ -3103,7 +3104,9 @@ msgid "" "Starting with version 0.6, <command>APT</command> contains code that does " "signature checking of the Release file for all repositories. This ensures " "that data like packages in the archive can't be modified by people who have " -"no access to the Release file signing key." +"no access to the Release file signing key. Starting with version 1.1 " +"<command>APT</command> requires repositories to provide recent " +"authentication information for unimpeded usage of the repository." msgstr "" "Desde la versión 0.6, <command>apt</command> contiene el código que realiza " "la comprobación de la firma del fichero «Release» para todos los archivos. " @@ -3114,20 +3117,48 @@ msgstr "" #: apt-secure.8.xml msgid "" "If an archive has an unsigned Release file or no Release file at all current " -"APT versions will raise a warning in <command>update</command> operations " -"and front-ends like <command>apt-get</command> will require explicit " -"confirmation if an installation request includes a package from such an " -"unauthenticated archive." +"APT versions will refuse to download data from them by default in " +"<command>update</command> operations and even if forced to download front-" +"ends like &apt-get; will require explicit confirmation if an installation " +"request includes a package from such an unauthenticated archive." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><para> #: apt-secure.8.xml msgid "" -"In the future APT will refuse to work with unauthenticated repositories by " -"default until support for them is removed entirely. Users have the option to " -"opt-in to this behavior already by setting the configuration option " -"<option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to <literal>false</" -"literal>." +"As a temporary exception &apt-get; (not &apt;!) raises warnings only if it " +"encounters unauthenticated archives to give a slightly longer grace period " +"on this backward compatibility effecting change. This exception will be " +"removed in future releases and you can opt-out of this grace period by " +"setting the configuration option <option>Binary::apt-get::Acquire::" +"AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to <literal>false</literal> or <option>--" +"no-allow-insecure-repositories</option> on the command line." +msgstr "" + +#. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><para> +#: apt-secure.8.xml +msgid "" +"You can force all APT clients to raise only warnings by setting the " +"configuration option <option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to " +"<literal>true</literal>. Individual repositories can also be allowed to be " +"insecure via the &sources-list; option <literal>allow-insecure=yes</" +"literal>. Note that insecure repositories are strongly discouraged and all " +"options to force apt to continue supporting them will eventually be " +"removed. Users also have the <option>Trusted</option> option available to " +"disable even the warnings, but be sure to understand the implications as " +"detailed in &sources-list;." +msgstr "" + +#. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><para> +#: apt-secure.8.xml +msgid "" +"A repository which previously was authentication but would loose this state " +"in an <command>update</command> operation raises an error in all APT clients " +"irrespective of the option to allow or forbid usage of insecure " +"repositories. The error can be overcome by additionally setting " +"<option>Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories</option> to " +"<literal>true</literal> or for Individual repositories with the &sources-" +"list; option <literal>allow-downgrade-to-insecure=yes</literal>." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><para> @@ -4676,14 +4707,17 @@ msgstr "" #: apt.conf.5.xml msgid "" "<literal>Acquire::http::Proxy-Auto-Detect</literal> can be used to specify " -"an external command to discover the http proxy to use. Apt expects the " -"command to output the proxy on stdout in the style <literal>http://proxy:" -"port/</literal>. This will override the generic <literal>Acquire::http::" -"Proxy</literal> but not any specific host proxy configuration set via " -"<literal>Acquire::http::Proxy::$HOST</literal>. See the &squid-deb-proxy-" -"client; package for an example implementation that uses avahi. This option " -"takes precedence over the legacy option name <literal>ProxyAutoDetect</" -"literal>." +"an external command to discover the http proxy to use. The first and only " +"parameter is an URI denoting the host to be contacted to allow for host-" +"specific configuration. APT expects the command to output the proxy on " +"stdout as a single line in the style <literal>http://proxy:port/</literal> " +"or the word <literal>DIRECT</literal> if no proxy should be used. No output " +"indicates that the generic proxy settings should be used. Note that auto-" +"detection will not be used for a host if a host-specific proxy configuration " +"is already set via <literal>Acquire::http::Proxy::<replaceable>HOST</" +"replaceable></literal>. See the &squid-deb-proxy-client; package for an " +"example implementation that uses avahi. This option takes precedence over " +"the legacy option name <literal>ProxyAutoDetect</literal>." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><variablelist><varlistentry><listitem><para> @@ -5130,21 +5164,30 @@ msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><variablelist><varlistentry><listitem><para> #: apt.conf.5.xml msgid "" -"Allow the update operation to load data files from a repository without a " -"trusted signature. If enabled this option no data files will be loaded and " -"the update operation fails with a error for this source. The default is " -"false for backward compatibility. This will be changed in the future." +"Allow update operations to load data files from repositories without " +"sufficient security information. The default value is \"<literal>false</" +"literal>\". Concept, implications as well as alternatives are detailed in " +"&apt-secure;." +msgstr "" + +#. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><variablelist><varlistentry><listitem><para> +#: apt.conf.5.xml +msgid "" +"Allow update operations to load data files from repositories which provide " +"security information, but these are deemed no longer cryptographically " +"strong enough. The default value is \"<literal>false</literal>\". Concept, " +"implications as well as alternatives are detailed in &apt-secure;." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><variablelist><varlistentry><listitem><para> #: apt.conf.5.xml msgid "" "Allow that a repository that was previously gpg signed to become unsigned " -"durign a update operation. When there is no valid signature of a previously " -"trusted repository apt will refuse the update. This option can be used to " -"override this protection. You almost certainly never want to enable this. " -"The default is false. Note that apt will still consider packages from this " -"source untrusted and warn about them if you try to install them." +"during an update operation. When there is no valid signature for a " +"previously trusted repository apt will refuse the update. This option can be " +"used to override this protection. You almost certainly never want to enable " +"this. The default is <literal>false</literal>. Concept, implications as " +"well as alternatives are detailed in &apt-secure;." msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><variablelist><varlistentry><term> @@ -8039,6 +8082,17 @@ msgstr "" #. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><para><itemizedlist><listitem><para> #: sources.list.5.xml msgid "" +"<option>Allow-Insecure</option> (<option>allow-insecure</option>), " +"<option>Allow-Weak</option> (<option>allow-weak</option>) and <option>Allow-" +"Downgrade-To-Insecure</option> (<option>allow-downgrade-to-insecure</" +"option>) are boolean values which all default to <literal>no</literal>. If " +"set to <literal>yes</literal> they circumvent parts of &apt-secure; and " +"should therefore not be used lightly!" +msgstr "" + +#. type: Content of: <refentry><refsect1><para><itemizedlist><listitem><para> +#: sources.list.5.xml +msgid "" "<option>Trusted</option> (<option>trusted</option>) is a tri-state value " "which defaults to APT deciding if a source is considered trusted or if " "warnings should be raised before e.g. packages are installed from this " |