| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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apt-key has inconsistent behaviour if it can't read a keyring file:
Commands like 'list' skipped silently over such keyrings while 'verify'
failed hard resulting in apt to report cconfusing gpg errors (#834973).
As a first step we teach apt-key to be more consistent here skipping in
all commands over unreadable keyrings, but issuing a warning in the
process, which is as usual for apt commands displayed at the end of the
run.
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Fingerprints tend to be displayed in space-separated octet pairs so be
nice and allow delete to remove a key based on such a string rather than
requiring that the user is deleting all the spaces manually.
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We need to support partial upgrades anyhow, so we have to deal with the
different versions and your tests try to ensure that we do, so we
shouldn't make any explicit higher requirements.
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First seen on hurd, but easily reproducible on all systems by removing
the 'execution' bit from the current working directory and watching some
tests (mostly the no-output expecting tests) fail due to find printing:
"find: Failed to restore initial working directory: …"
Samuel Thibault says in the bugreport:
| To do its work, find first records the $PWD, then goes to
| /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ to find the files, and then goes back to $PWD.
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| On Linux, getting $PWD from the 700 directory happens to work by luck
| (POSIX says that getcwd can return [EACCES]: Search permission was denied
| for the current directory, or read or search permission was denied for a
| directory above the current directory in the file hierarchy). And going
| back to $PWD fails, and thus find returns 1, but at least it emitted its
| output.
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| On Hurd, getting $PWD from the 700 directory fails, and find thus aborts
| immediately, without emitting any output, and thus no keyring is found.
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| So, to summarize, the issue is that since apt-get update runs find as a
| non-root user, running it from a 700 directory breaks find.
Solved as suggested by changing to '/' before running find, with some
paranoia extra care taking to ensure the paths we give to find are really
absolute paths first (they really should, but TMPDIR=. or a similar
Dir::Etc::trustedparts setting could exist somewhere in the wild).
The commit takes also the opportunity to make these lines slightly less
error ignoring and the two find calls using (mostly) the same parameters.
Thanks: Samuel Thibault for 'finding' the culprit!
Closes: 826043
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gpg doesn't give use a UID on NODATA, which we were "expecting" (but not
using for anything), but just an error number. Instead of collecting
these as badsigners which will trigger a "invald signature" error with
remarks like "NODATA 1" we instead adapt a message similar to the NODATA
error of a clearsigned file (which is actually not reached anymore as we
split them up, which fails with a NOSPLIT error, which uses the same
general error message).
In other words: Not a security relevant change, just a user experience
improvement as we now point them to the most likely cause of the
problem instead of saying "invalid signature" which would point them in
the direction of the archive being broken (for everyone) instead.
Closes: 823746
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Daniel Kahn Gillmor highlights in the bugreport that security isn't
improving by having the user import additional keys – especially as
importing keys securely is hard.
The bugreport was initially about dropping the warning to a notice, but
in given the previously mentioned observation and the fact that we
weren't printing a warning (or a notice) for expired or revoked keys
providing a signature we drop it completely as the code to display a
message if this was the only key is in another path – and is considered
critical.
Closes: 618445
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Fixed in f7bd44bae0d7cb7f9838490b5eece075da83899e already, but the
commit misses the Closes tag and while we are at it we can add a simple
regression test and micro-optimize it a bit.
Thanks: James McCoy for the suggestion.
Closes: 816691
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The output changes slightly between different versions, which we already
dealt with in the main testcase for apt-key, but there are two more
which do not test both versions explicitly and so still had gpg1 output
to check against as this is the default at the moment.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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apt-key creates internally a script (since ~1.1) which it will call to
avoid dealing with an array of different options in the code itself, but
while writing this script it wraps the values in "", which will cause
the shell to evaluate its content upon execution.
To make 'use' of this either set a absolute gpg command or TMPDIR to
something as interesting as:
"/tmp/This is fü\$\$ing cràzy, \$(man man | head -n1 | cut -d' ' -f1)\$!"
If such paths can be encountered in reality is a different question…
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This doesn't allow all tests to run cleanly, but it at least allows to
write tests which could run successfully in such environments.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Filenames we get could include spaces, but also the tmpdir we work in
and the failures we print in return a very generic and unhelpful…
Properly supporting spaces is a bit painful as we constructed gpg
command before, which is now moved to (multilevel) calls to temporary
scripts instead.
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The previous commit returns to the possibility of using just gpgv for
verification proposes. There is one problem through: We can't enforce a
specific keyid without using gpg, but our acquire method can as it
parses gpgv output anyway, so it can deal with good signatures from not
expected signatures and treats them as unknown keys instead.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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If all keyrings are simple keyrings we can merge the keyrings with cat
rather than doing a detour over gpg --export | --import (see #790665),
which means 'apt-key verify' can do without gpg and just use gpgv as
before the merging change.
We declare this gpgv usage explicit now in the dependencies. This isn't
a new dependency as gnupg as well as debian-archive-keyring depend on
and we used it before unconditionally, just that we didn't declare it.
The handling of the merged keyring needs to be slightly different as our
merged keyring can end up containing the same key multiple times, but at
least currently gpg does remove only the first occurrence with
--delete-keys, so we move the handling to a if one is gone, all are gone
rather than an (implicit) quid pro quo or even no effect.
Thanks: Daniel Kahn Gillmor for the suggestion
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The output of gpg slightly changes in 2.1 which breaks the testcase, but
the real problem is that this branch introduces a new default keyring
format (which is called keybox) and mixing it with simple keyrings (the
previous default format) has various problems like failing in the keybox
to keyring import (#790665) or [older] gpgv versions not being able to
deal with keyboxes (and newer versions as well currently:
https://bugs.gnupg.org/gnupg/issue2025).
We fix this by being a bit more careful in who creates keyrings (aka: we
do it or we take a simple keyring as base) to ensure we always have a
keyring instead of a keybox. This way we can ensure that any version
combination of gpv/gpgv2 and gnupg/gnupg2 without doing explicit version
checks and use the same code for all of them.
Closes: 781042
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Limits which key(s) can be used to sign a repository. Not immensely useful
from a security perspective all by itself, but if the user has
additional measures in place to confine a repository (like pinning) an
attacker who gets the key for such a repository is limited to its
potential and can't use the key to sign its attacks for an other (maybe
less limited) repository… (yes, this is as weak as it sounds, but having
the capability might come in handy for implementing other stuff later).
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Conflicts:
apt-pkg/acquire-item.cc
cmdline/apt-key.in
methods/https.cc
test/integration/test-apt-key
test/integration/test-multiarch-foreign
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gnupg is case-insensitive about keyids, so back then apt-key called it
directly any keyid was accepted, but now that we work more with the
keyid ourself we regressed to require uppercase keyids by accident.
This is also inconsistent with other apt-key commands which still use
gnupg directly. A single case-insensitive grep and we are fine again.
Closes: 781696
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apt-key given a long keyid reports just "OK" all the time, but doesn't
delete the mentioned key as it doesn't find the key.
Note: In debian/experimental this was closed with
29f1b977100aeb6d6ebd38923eeb7a623e264ffe which just added the testcase
as the rewrite of apt-key had fixed this as well.
Closes: 754436
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We use test{success,failure} now all over the place in the framework, so
its only consequencial to do this in the situations in which we test for
a specific output as well.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Git-Dch: Ignore
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apt-key creates trusted.gpg if it needs it with 644 nowadays, but before
it ensured this, it was gpg creating it, which gives it by default 600.
Not a problem as long as our gpgv is run as root, but now that we drop
privileges we have to ensure that we can also read trusted.gpg files
created by earlier apt-key versions.
Closes: 647001
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The original patch does not apply against the rewritten apt-key,
but an additional test doesn't hurt.
Closes: 754436
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We were down to at most two keyrings before, but gnupg upstream plans
dropping support for multiple keyrings in the longrun, so with a
single keyring we hope to be future proof – and 'apt-key adv' isn't a
problem anymore as every change to the keys is merged back, so we have
now the same behavior as before, but support an unlimited amount of
trusted.gpg.d keyrings.
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Git-Dch: Ignore
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If both are available APT will still prefer gpg over gpg2 as it is a bit
more lightweight, but it shouldn't be a problem to use one or the other
(at least at the moment, who knows what will happen in the future).
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Having fragement files means there is a good chance that there is one
key per keyring, so deal with that as well as with setups in which
keyrings are linked into trusted.gpg.d as we can't just modify those
files (they might be in /usr for example).
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Might come in handy for more than just a simple testcase.
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