| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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A user can specify multiple fingerprints for a while now, so its seems
counter-intuitive to support only one keyring, especially if this isn't
really checked or enforced and while unlikely mixtures of both should
work properly, too, instead of a kinda random behaviour.
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If we limit a file to be signed by a certain key it should usually
accept also being signed by any of this keys subkeys instead of
requiring each subkey to be listed explicitly. If the later is really
wanted we support now also the same syntax as gpg does with appending an
exclamation mark at the end of the fingerprint to force no mapping.
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Most of them in (old) code comments. The two instances of user visible
string changes the po files of the manpages are fixed up as well.
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
Reported-By: spellintian
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In 105503b4b470c124bc0c271bd8a50e25ecbe9133 we got a warning implemented
for unreadable files which greatly improves the behavior of apt update
already as everything will work as long as we don't need the keys
included in these files. The behavior if they are needed is still
strange through as update will fail claiming missing keys and a manual
test (which the user will likely perform as root) will be successful.
Passing the new warning generated by apt-key through to apt is a bit
strange from an interface point of view, but basically duplicating the
warning code in multiple places doesn't feel right either. That means we
have no translation for the message through as apt-key has no i18n yet.
It also means that if the user has a bunch of sources each of them will
generate a warning for each unreadable file which could result in quite
a few duplicated warnings, but "too many" is better than none.
Closes: 834973
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We need to support partial upgrades anyhow, so we have to deal with the
different versions and your tests try to ensure that we do, so we
shouldn't make any explicit higher requirements.
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If the server told us in a previous request that it isn't supporting
Ranges with bytes via an Accept-Ranges header missing bytes, we don't
try to formulate requests using Ranges.
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Reported-By: cppcheck
Gbp-Dch: Ignore
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Weak had no dedicated option before and Insecure and Downgrade were both
global options, which given the effect they all have on security is
rather bad. Setting them for individual repositories only isn't great
but at least slightly better and also more consistent with other
settings for repositories.
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Most tests just need a signed repository and don't care if it signed by
an InRelease file or a Release.gpg file, so we can save some time by
just generating one of them by default.
Sounds like not much, but quickly adds up to a few seconds with the
amount of tests we have accumulated by now.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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If the test just signs release files to throw away one of them to test
the other, we can just as well save the time and not create it.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Users have the option since apt >= 1.1 to enforce that a Release file is
signed with specific key(s) either via keyring filename or fingerprints.
This commit adds an entry with the same name and value (except that it
doesn't accept filenames for obvious reasons) to the Release file so
that the repository owner can set a default value for this setting
effecting the *next* Release file, not the current one, which provides a
functionality similar "HTTP Public Key Pinning". The pinning is in
effect as long as the (then old) Release file is considered valid, but
it is also ignored if the Release file has no Valid-Until at all.
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A keyring file can include multiple keys, so its only fair for
transitions and such to support multiple fingerprints as well.
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Daniel Kahn Gillmor highlights in the bugreport that security isn't
improving by having the user import additional keys – especially as
importing keys securely is hard.
The bugreport was initially about dropping the warning to a notice, but
in given the previously mentioned observation and the fact that we
weren't printing a warning (or a notice) for expired or revoked keys
providing a signature we drop it completely as the code to display a
message if this was the only key is in another path – and is considered
critical.
Closes: 618445
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Signatures on data can have an expiration date, too, which we hadn't
handled previously explicitly (no problem – gpg still has a non-zero
exit code so apt notices the invalid signature) so the error message
wasn't as helpful as it could be (aka mentioning the key signing it).
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The upstream documentation says about KEYEXPIRED:
"This status line is not very useful". Indeed, it doesn't mention which
key is expired, and suggests to use the other message which does.
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Introduces APT::Hashes::<NAME> with entries Untrusted and Weak
which can be set to true to cause the hash to be treated as
untrusted and/or weak.
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Our own gpgv method can declare a digest algorithm as untrusted and
handles these as worthless signatures. If gpgv comes with inbuilt
untrusted (which is called weak in official terminology) which it e.g.
does for MD5 in recent versions we should handle it in the same way.
To check this we use the most uncommon still fully trusted hash as a
configureable one via a hidden config option to toggle through all of
the three states a hash can be in.
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Using erase(pos) is invalid in our case here as pos must be a valid and
derefenceable iterator, which isn't the case for an end-iterator (like
if we had no good signature).
The problem runs deeper still through as VALIDSIG is a keyid while
GOODSIG is just a longid so comparing them will always fail.
Closes: 818910
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This doesn't allow all tests to run cleanly, but it at least allows to
write tests which could run successfully in such environments.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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This allows running tests in parallel.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Not all tests work yet, most notable the cdrom tests, but those require
changes in libapt itself to have a proper fix and what we have fixed so
far is good enough progress for now.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Reported-By: codespell
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This enables more fine grained control over such exceptions.
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Further abstracting our new ShowList allows to use it for containers of
strings as well giving us the option to implement an or-groups display
for the recommends and suggests lists which is a nice trick given that
it also helps with migrating the last remaining other cases of old
ShowList.
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The previous commit returns to the possibility of using just gpgv for
verification proposes. There is one problem through: We can't enforce a
specific keyid without using gpg, but our acquire method can as it
parses gpgv output anyway, so it can deal with good signatures from not
expected signatures and treats them as unknown keys instead.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Limits which key(s) can be used to sign a repository. Not immensely useful
from a security perspective all by itself, but if the user has
additional measures in place to confine a repository (like pinning) an
attacker who gets the key for such a repository is limited to its
potential and can't use the key to sign its attacks for an other (maybe
less limited) repository… (yes, this is as weak as it sounds, but having
the capability might come in handy for implementing other stuff later).
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It is a rather strange sight that index items use SiteOnly which strips
the Path, while e.g. deb files are downloaded with NoUserPassword which
does not. Important to note here is that for the file transport Path is
pretty important as there is no Host which would be displayed by Site,
which always resulted in "interesting" unspecific errors for "file:".
Adding a 'middle' ground between the two which does show the Path but
potentially modifies it (it strips a pending / at the end if existing)
solves this "file:" issue, syncs the output and in the end helps to
identify which file is meant exactly in progress output and co as a
single site can have multiple repositories in different paths.
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Valid-Until protects us from long-living downgrade attacks, but not all
repositories have it and an attacker could still use older but still
valid files to downgrade us. While this makes it sounds like a security
improvement now, its a bit theoretical at best as an attacker with
capabilities to pull this off could just as well always keep us days
(but in the valid period) behind and always knows which state we have,
as we tell him with the If-Modified-Since header. This is also why this
is 'silently' ignored and treated as an IMSHit rather than screamed at
the user as this can at best be an annoyance for attackers.
An error here would 'regularily' be encountered by users by out-of-sync
mirrors serving a single run (e.g. load balancer) or in two consecutive
runs on the other hand, so it would just help teaching people ignore it.
That said, most of the code churn is caused by enforcing this additional
requirement. Crisscross from InRelease to Release.gpg is e.g. very
unlikely in practice, but if we would ignore it an attacker could
sidestep it this way.
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We use test{success,failure} now all over the place in the framework, so
its only consequencial to do this in the situations in which we test for
a specific output as well.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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The URI to use to set a config option is a bit arcane to write/remember
and checking if the setting was successful doubly so.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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If we get a 416 from the server it means the Range we asked for is above
the real filesize of the file on the server. Mostly this happens if the
server isn't supporting If-Range, but regardless of how we end up with
the partial data, the data is invalid so we discard it and retry with a
fresh plate and hope for the best.
Old behavior was to consider 416 an error and retry with a different
compression until we ran out of compression and requested the
uncompressed file (which doesn't exist on most mirrors) with an accept
line which server answered with "406 Not Acceptable".
Closes: 710924
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Compressing files in 4 different styles eats test-time for no practical
gain if we don't test them explicitly, so default to just building 'gz'
compressed files as it is the simplest compression algorithm supported
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Signing files with expired keys is not as easy as it sounds, so the
framework jumps a few loops to do it, but it might come in handy to have
an expired key around for later tests even if it is not that different
from having no key in regards to APT behaviour.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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Forking only after being ready to accept clients avoids running races
with the tests which sometimes failed on the first 'apt-get update'
(or similar) with the previous background-start and hope for the best…
The commit fixes also some oversight output-order changes in regards to
Description-md5 and (I-M-S) race conditions in various tests.
Git-Dch: Ignore
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- CVE-2013-1051
* apt-pkg/deb/debmetaindex.cc,
test/integration/test-bug-595691-empty-and-broken-archive-files,
test/integration/test-releasefile-verification:
- disable InRelease downloading until the verification issue is
fixed, thanks to Ansgar Burchardt for finding the flaw
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invalid in most cases anyway
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* apt-pkg/deb/deblistparser.cc:
- rewrite LoadReleaseInfo to cope with clearsigned Releasefiles
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